Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
F iscal disparities among parallel governments-municipalities within a state or states within the nation-represent a policy concern when the overlying government (state or nation) has an interest in levels of services and/or tax rates across its subdivisions. According to Yinger (1986) , "fi scal disparities exist when some cities can provide a given level of local public services at lower cost or at less sacrifi ce than can other cities." In Massachusetts, residents are served by 351 mutually exclusive and exhaustive cities and towns; each municipality is responsible for the entire range of common local services, including schools, police and fi re protection, public works, human services, libraries and recreation, etc. (counties and other overlying sub-state governments are virtually nonexistent). This very local character of city and town government makes Massachusetts prone to substantial interjurisdictional fi scal disparities. As other research indicates and as we show below, both the environment in which these services are produced and the resources available to fi nance them vary markedly across municipalities in ways that affect the cost or tax burden involved in providing common services of average quality. The resulting fi scal disparities lead to inequity and ineffi ciency, which are mostly outside the control of local governments (Yinger, 1986) . Previous research suggests that the overlying government may counteract such disparities and improve social welfare through intergovernmental aid (e.g., Bradbury, Ladd, Perrault, Reschovsky, and Yinger, 1984; Yinger, 1986) , and Massachusetts state government has Measuring Non-School Fiscal Disparities among Municipalities a history of providing general-purpose municipal aid, in addition to earmarked school aid.
Partly because increases in state aid were concentrated on public schools during the 1990s and partly because state budget cuts during recent economic downturns have reduced non-school aid and generally made it unpredictable, cities and towns in Massachusetts are under considerable fi scal strain. In recent years, many communities instituted layoffs and cut services, and many raised property taxes (see Municipal Finance Task Force, 2005; Bluestone, Clayton-Matthews, and Soule, 2006) . Because the two existing general-purpose municipal aid formulas are viewed as being unresponsive to communities' needs, 1 policymakers are exploring alternative formulas for distributing non-school aid.
Formulas to allocate local aid in most states-whether for schools or for general municipal purposes-typically distribute funds in inverse proportion to each jurisdiction's ability to raise revenue locally (that is, local revenue capacity) and/or in proportion to its needs or costs.
2 The revenue-capacity side of the calculation typically takes account of the size of the tax bases that local governments are authorized to tap. The cost/need-side is generally extremely simple or ad hoc, often using population alone (or enrollment in the case of school aid) to represent need. Our research develops new measures of both elements to refl ect more accurately the realities and constraints of local government in Massachusetts.
To improve the measurement of revenue capacity, this paper focuses on accounting for the constraints of a tax limitation, for the fi rst time in the literature. We incorporate the effects of Proposition 2½-the local property tax limitation in Massachusetts-in our measure of local revenue capacity. Proposition 2½ caps property tax rates and limits year-to-year growth in property tax revenues of each city and town, but allows local voters to override the growth limits. Because Proposition 2½ differentially limits individual cities' and towns' ability to generate revenue from their property tax bases, many local offi cials argue that the existing lottery aid formula, which distributes aid in inverse proportion to communities' per capita property tax bases, is unfair. On the other hand, Proposition 2½'s annual levy limits cannot be treated as exogenous binding constraints because local voters can, and in many communities do, override them. Our research uses data on recent taxing patterns to develop a measure of the effects of the constraints on local property taxation-a measure not in the control of local offi cials or local voters-and uses that measure to adjust the size of the local property tax base in measuring revenue capacity. Also different from the standard approach, in which revenue capacity depends only on the size of the property 1 A cost-based aid formula introduced over 20 years ago has not functioned properly since the early 1990s and the formula that allocates the only other substantial municipal aid (lottery aid) is not comprehensive, mainly because it does not consider cost differentials across communities, but also because it considers only property values in measuring local resources. The cost-based aid formula included schools in its cost and capacity measures. It was used to calculate total aid in proportion to the difference between costs and capacity, then school aid was calculated according to a separate formula, and "Additional Assistance" was the residual (municipal) aid. As school aid expanded over time and Additional Assistance funds grew slowly and then declined in real terms, the interactive operation of the two formulas implied that school aid appeared to address the need-revenue gaps of many communities, eliminating their entitlement to general municipal aid (Additional Assistance).
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The terms "costs" and "needs" (or "expenditure needs") are sometimes used interchangeably. For example, Bradbury et al. (1984) report that " [uncontrollable] cost disparities produce what some people have referred to as variations in service 'needs'" (p. 152); Ladd and Yinger (1989) combine cost indexes for police, fi re, and general services into a measure of "standardized expenditure need." tax base, our measure of revenue capacity takes account of the ability to raise revenue from other (non-property-tax) local sources. In addition, we explicitly remove the capacity not available for general municipal (non-school) purposes such as the funds the state government requires communities to dedicate to public schools.
On the cost side, unlike previous studies of either total spending or school spending, our research focuses on non-school spending. Following Bradbury et al. (1984) , Yinger (1988a Yinger ( , 1988b , Ladd and Yinger (1989) , and Ladd, Reschovsky, and Yinger (1991) , 3 we use regression analysis and recent data to quantify the relationship between local non-school spending and environmental cost proxies that are outside the control of local governments, such as population density and commuters per capita. Our regressions also control for demand, effi ciency, and institutional factors that infl uence spending.
The difference between these measures of municipal costs and capacity for each community represents a new measure of non-school fiscal "gap," which can provide the basis for a new aid formula to channel more aid to communities with larger gaps. For such a purpose, the measures of costs and capacity must be predetermined-not in the immediate control of local governments; otherwise, the formula would reward communities that are ineffi cient or put less effort into raising revenue, and would create incentives for local offi cials to change behavior in ways that increase the amount of aidby adding to measured costs or reducing measured capacity. This search for predetermined-and still relevant-indicators is a critical challenge in measuring both costs and capacity. As discussed below, the estimates that are produced by our methodology may be subject to some of the same biases seen elsewhere in the literature. But Louis, Jabine, and Gerstein (2003) argue that developing rational and systematic estimates of cost and capacity, even if they are fl awed, is still preferable to the ad hoc adjustments adopted in most formulas used to allocate intergovernmental aid.
LOCAL REVENUE CAPACITY
Local revenue capacity is defi ned as the ability of local governments to raise revenues from local resources. It should, therefore, refl ect resources local governments could tax, not actual revenues raised, because local governments can choose to tax local resources at different rates. In addition to the relative wealth of resources that local governments can tap, a measure of capacity should also reflect external constraints on raising revenues from those resources, such as tax limitations or outright prohibition of specifi c revenue sources. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) developed an approach to measuring revenue capacity called the "Representative Revenue System (RRS)" (ACIR, 1962 (ACIR, , 1971 (ACIR, , and 1986 . RRS assigns a standard tax rate to each tax base of all local or state governments, so that the measured revenue capacity from taxes is strictly proportional to the size of the tax bases and does not depend upon how heavily they are actually taxed. This approach is widely used in measuring local revenue capacity, in particular, as there are usually no institutional differences among local jurisdictions within a state, which would make inter-community comparisons diffi cult.
Property taxes are often the largest source of local revenues. In most states' local aid formulas-including the lottery 3 The research reported in Bradbury et al. (1984) formed the basis of the cost-based local aid formula enacted in the mid-1980s in Massachusetts. Ladd, Reschovsky, and Yinger (1991) laid out the foundation for a later, cost-based formula for Minnesota.
aid formula in Massachusetts-property tax capacity is measured as a constant proportion of the property tax base using a standard RRS approach. An important assumption underlying this approach is that all cities and towns can tap into their property tax base to the same degree. However, this assumption may not hold in states with local property tax limitations. If cities and towns face differential impacts of local tax limitations, then they are able to tap into their property tax base only to varying degrees. In a survey of existing general-purpose local aid formulas of the 50 states conducted in the spring of 2006, we found that none incorporates the constraints of local tax limitations in their measures of local revenue capacity.
Proposition 2½, enacted by referendum in 1980, limits local property taxes in Massachusetts in two ways (Massachusetts Department of Revenue, 2005) : (1) in the first three years after its enactment, it brought all municipalities' property tax rates down to 2½ percent of the estimated market value of their property tax bases and permanently capped them at 2½ percent (this rate limit is called the "levy ceiling"), which voters are prohibited from overriding except temporarily via capital or debt exclusions; (2) it set a "levy limit"-a limit on the annual property tax levy (that is, total property tax revenues)-that rises by only 2½ percent per year plus an allowance for taxes on any value added to the tax base by new construction and substantial renovation ("new growth") plus overrides that local voters enact. Votes to override the growth limit raise the levy limit permanently, adding to the base to which the next year's automatic 2½ percent growth rate is applied. 
The 2½-percent tax-rate levy ceiling was binding in the early years of Proposition 2½, but its importance has significantly decreased as a result of substantial growth in property values. By contrast, limits on levy growth remain important for many cities and towns in Massachusetts, with FY2006 levies in almost half of the 351 cities and towns within 0.1 percent of their levy limits, and over two-thirds within one percent. 4 With levy limits as the relevant constraint in many cases, the simplest approach to incorporating Proposition 2½'s constraints into a measure of property tax capacity would seem to be to set the capacity measure equal to the levy limit. However, the levy limit includes overrides, which some communities manage to propose and pass, loosening the constraints, while others do not; some local governments, perhaps believing that they have no chance of passing an override, have never put one on the ballot. Thus, the levy limit, which appears at fi rst blush to be an exogenous binding constraint, is not exogenous, and because of these differential impacts of Proposition 2½, the ability of cities and towns to tap into their property tax bases varies. Consistent with the pattern observed in Massachusetts, Figlio (1997) and Mullins and Wallin (2004) suggest that limits on revenue growth are more likely to bind local governments than are ceilings on the tax rate.
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Even if the levy limit were fully binding and, hence, a good measure of property tax capacity, capacity would not be proportional to the size of the local property tax base.
To model the ability of cities and towns to tap into their property tax bases under Proposition 2½, we hypothesize that the ability increases with local residents' income. The intuition behind the hypothesis is grounded in consumer theory. Local residents in each community have limited incomes and face household budget constraints. They choose between publicly and privately provided goods and services in order to maximize their utility. Their income levels, thus, constrain their ability to pay for local public goods and services, and thereby infl uence their willingness to subject themselves to increased property taxation to support those services.
This hypothesis is consistent with observations in previous studies. Bradbury (1991) and Reschovsky and Schwartz (1992) fi nd that Massachusetts communities with lower per capita incomes are less likely to propose overrides than those with higher incomes, other things being equal. Bradbury's analysis fi nds an even larger effect of income on the probability that an override will pass. In addition, Bradbury (1991) and Reschovsky and Schwartz (1992) show that a community's override choice depends on its preferences and "tastes"-which affect the demand for local public services-and on other community characteristics that determine the distribution of public spending benefi ts.
Combining their research fi ndings and our hypothesis suggests that whether a community passes an override in a given year can be seen as a function of income as well as other factors. Income then enters the property tax levy equation, via its effect on override passage, refl ecting the greater "ability to tap" the property tax base that overrides represent:
Based on this model, we empirically investigate the relationship between income and property tax levies across Massachusetts cities and towns in 2000 in order to judge whether income might proxy for the ability of individual communities to tap into their property tax bases after operating under the constraints of Proposition 2½ for almost 20 years. If so, because income (like the property tax base itself) is predetermined from the point of view of each local government at any point in time, it could be used to adjust the size of the local property tax base in measuring (constrained) property tax capacity.
One might question the exogeneity of either income or the property tax base in the equation, because when there are many geographically small local governments, as in Massachusetts, households and businesses may choose to locate in cities and towns with the local property tax rates that they prefer. Although "Tiebout sorting" may occur in the long run, it seems unlikely to be an important factor in the current context for several reasons. First, Yinger (1986) shows that mobility between adjacent communities and migration among urban areas-even with their associated housing price adjustments-do not eliminate fi scal disparities, including those related to capacity differences. Second, even if some location responses do occur, it is still the case that at any point in time, the income and the size of the property tax base-and, hence, a community's ability to raise revenueare outside the control of local governments. Finally, the potential endogeneity of income and the size of the property tax base resulting from migration and capitalization of property taxes would bias our estimated coefficients only downward to zero, not upward. All else equal, an increase in a community's property taxes could induce out-migration from that community and, thus, put downward pressure on its per capita property values and incomes. The theory of property tax capitalization initially developed and tested by Oates (1969) and numerous empirical studies following Oates's study (e.g., Yinger, Bloom, Borsch-Supan, and Ladd, 1988; Palmon and Smith, 1998) show that property values are negatively affected by taxes.
This paper uses regression analysis of data on municipalities' taxing patterns in 2000 to quantify the effects of Proposition 2½ and develop a new measure of property tax capacity. Because it is local residents who vote and the income level of local residents that matters in passing an override, we measure revenue capacity from residential and open-space (residential, for short) property and from commercial, industrial, and personal (CIP) property separately. In our empirical model, we assume that residential property tax capacity (residential capacity, for short) is determined by the interaction of the residential property tax base and the ability of local governments to tap into that tax base, which we model as a function of residents' incomes. Under these assumptions, we estimate a reduced-form equation,
where the variables are expressed in per capita terms and are subscripted for municipality i; ε i is the residual. The loglog functional form allows for potential nonlinearity in the relationships. This baseline model does not include taste or distribution variables, which we add to later specifi cations as a robustness check.
As data for small communities tend to be noisy, we use a sub-sample comprising 321 cities and towns with population larger than 1,000 in the year 2000. 6 Summary statistics for the variables are reported in Table 1 and data sources are listed in Appendix Table 1A .
Our study is conceptually different from Akin (1973) , Ladd (1975), and Tannenwald, Perrault, and Wattenberg (1987) , who also run regressions of revenue on various tax bases and income. They consider income as an underlying tax base and interpret the estimated coeffi cients on income and property values as weights of the tax bases in measuring revenue capacity. By contrast, our approach uses income to represent the constraints of Proposition 2½. Table 2 reports the regression results, including estimated coefficients and "robust" (Huber-White sandwich) estimates of standard errors. As shown in the fi rst column, the estimated coeffi cients on log income per capita and log per capita residential value are positive and highly significant. A positive coefficient on income is consistent with the hypothesis that the ability of local governments to tap into their residential property tax base increases with residents' income.
7 Estimated regressions shown in the remaining columns of Table 2 address several potential biases and fi nd that column (1)'s baseline results are quite robust.
First, because income is often used as a proxy variable for community residents' preferences or tastes, the estimated coeffi cient on income in the baseline model may capture some taste or preference variations, not just the constraints of Proposition 2½. To explore this issue, we add a standard set of control variables for 6 When we run the same regressions using data for all 351 cities and towns, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 2 , but the R-squared is smaller.
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In addition to being refl ected in the coeffi cient on the income variable, some constraints of Proposition 2½ may be refl ected in the fact that the coeffi cient on log per capita residential value is less than one. That is, residential value does not translate proportionally into residential capacity even in a community with average income. preferences and tastes in the regression reported in column (2); almost all of these control variables are strongly correlated with income. But the estimated coefficients on income and property value in the new regression are not signifi cantly different-statistically or economicallyfrom the baseline results.
Second, we add distribution variables used in Bradbury (1991) and Reschovsky and Schwartz (1992) , along with the preference and taste variables. These distribution variables are highly correlated with income. With all these controls, the income variable in the augmented regression shown in column (3) captures the true underlying ability to tap, not variations related to preferences. That regression yields coeffi cient estimates similar to the baseline results.
Third, the composition of the property tax base may explain some variations in the residential property tax levy because municipalities with higher CIP property value may have less need to raise revenue from residential property than municipalities with lower CIP property value. When we add log per capita CIP value to the baseline model (column (4)), the coeffi cients of interest on income and residential property value are again quite similar to those in column (1).
Fourth, extreme incomes in a community may significantly influence average income but not the median. To test the robustness of our results to different measures of income, we replace per capita income with median household income and re-run the property tax levy regression in per-household terms. The estimated relationships among residential levy, residential tax base, and income shown in column (5) are almost the same as in the baseline model.
Last, there are some municipalities, mostly on Cape Cod and the Islands, that have extraordinarily high per capita residential property values and roughly average per capita incomes. To investigate potential bias from these "outliers," we Notes: Asterisks indicate confi dence with which estimated coeffi cient is signifi cantly different from zero: *** 99% or greater; ** 95% to 99%; * 90% to 95%.
Observations are cities and towns in Massachusetts with population greater than 1,000 except in column (6). We drop 11 cities and towns with per capita residential value > $150,000 and per capita income < $40,000 from the sample in column (6). The dependent variable in column (5) Reschovsky and Schwartz (1992) show that the probability of proposing a property tax override does not depend upon state aid.
Using the baseline estimates, we construct a measure of residential property tax capacity that refl ects the constraints of Proposition 2½. Because the baseline coefficient estimates are very close to two-thirds and one-third, we use those fi gures for simplicity. Through a simple transformation, we can express residential capacity as
where τ 1 is a statewide constant, and all the variables are expressed in per capita terms. Under the assumption that a city or town with average characteristics taxes its residential property at its full capacitythat is, the per capita residential capacity of this "average community" is equal to the average per capita residential property tax levy-τ 1 can be calculated as the statewide average per capita residential property tax levy divided by the product of the statewide average per capita residential value raised to a power of two-thirds, and the statewide average income per capita raised to a power of one-third. In 2000, the statewide average per capita residential value, income, and residential levy were $78, 786, $27,233, and $969.6, respectively, so τ 1 is calculated to be 0.0175. According to the measure, a municipality with an average per capita residential property tax base and per capita income ten percent above the statewide average has an estimated per capita residential capacity 3.2 percent above average, all other things being equal. Moreover, a municipality with average per capita income and per capita residential property value ten percent above the statewide average possesses an estimated per capita residential capacity 6.6 percent above average.
We use the standard RRS approach to measure tax capacity from CIP property, calculating capacity as a constant proportion of CIP value. 8 In per capita terms,
When we investigate whether to use income in calculating CIP capacity in a manner parallel to residential capacity, we fi nd the relationship between per capita CIP levy and per capita income to be negative, controlling for per capita CIP value; that is, a given CIP value yields more property tax revenue in a low-income community than in a high-income community. These estimates refl ect the fact that Massachusetts cities and towns can choose to tax CIP property at a higher rate than residential property in order to shift some of the tax burden from local residents to business taxpayers. In 2000, 100 communities had split property tax rates and they were generally communities with below-average incomes. Thus, the negative relationship between CIP levy and income refl ects poor communities' decisions to shift the tax burden to business property, rather than a negative effect of income on ability to raise revenue. Because the relationship refl ects endogenous local decision-making, it would be inappropriate to include income in the measure of CIP capacity.
where τ 2 is a statewide constant. Under the (standard RRS) assumption that an average city or town taxes its CIP property at its full capacity, τ 2 can be calculated as the statewide average per capita CIP tax levy divided by the statewide average per capita CIP value. In 2000, τ 2 is equal to 0.0142.
CIP capacity is then added to residential capacity to obtain total property tax capacity. We believe that this is a better measure of property tax capacity than the levy ceiling or levy limit. As Figure 1 shows, the levy ceiling typically overestimates the underlying capacity, as it is proportional only to property values and ignores the override constraints.
9 Some municipalities (for example, some resort communities on Cape Cod and the Islands with extraordinarily high per capita residential property values and roughly average per capita incomes) do not have incomes high enough to be able to tap the property tax base as the levy ceiling implies. The per capita levy ceiling is highly associated with per capita property tax capacity, with a correlation of 0.87. But its distribution is wider; the ratio of 90 th percentile to 10 th percentile of the per capita levy ceiling is 3.6, compared to a ratio of 2.9 for per capita property tax capacity. Figure 2 is a scatter plot comparing our measure of property tax capacity with the levy limit. The levy limit underestimates capacity in some higher-income communities, which have the ability to tap their property tax bases but have chosen not to override their levy limits to that degree. The correlation between per capita levy limit and per capita property tax capacity is 0.82, but the distribution of the levy limit is somewhat narrower, with the ratio of 90 th percentile to 10 th percentile being 2.6.
In addition to property taxes, local governments in Massachusetts can raise Note that the levy ceiling-2½ percent of the property tax base-is proportional to a simple RRS measure of property tax capacity, and rises with property value faster than our capacity measure does.
revenues from selected other local sources, although they are not allowed to tax other broad bases. Just as for the property tax, measures of other revenue capacity should capture the underlying ability of a local government to raise revenue from these sources, but not individual communities' choices about tax rates, local option taxes, etc. Our measure includes capacity from the motor vehicle excise, local option hotel-motel excise, urban redevelopment excise, local share of state racing taxes, and state government payments in lieu of taxes for state-owned land (mostly forests). 10 A state statute sets the motor vehicle excise tax rate at $25 per $1000 of vehicle value, without a local-option provision. So a standard RRS approach is appropriate to measure motor vehicle excise tax capacity, which in this case is equal to the actual collection for each community. The urban redevelopment excise, local share of state racing taxes, and state government payments in lieu of taxes for state-owned land are administered by state agencies and distributed to municipalities along with state aid.
11 As they are outside the control of local government, we count the actual distributions directly in capacity.
Capacity to raise revenue from the local option hotel-motel excise is an interesting example. Data are available on the size of the tax base only for those communities We do not consider any type of state aid as part of local capacity because it is not drawn from local sources. Because existing state aid is not included in the calculation of capacity and, hence, the costcapacity gap, its treatment when designing a distribution formula for new aid is an important and complex issue. However, discussing methods of distributing aid-formula design-is beyond the scope of this paper. 11 More information about urban redevelopment excise, local share of state racing taxes, and state government payments in lieu of taxes for state-owned land, including their purpose, distribution formulas, and administration, is available at http://www.mass.gov/Ador/docs/dls/cherry/csmanual.pdf.
that have opted to levy the tax. We estimate the average per capita hotel-motel tax capacity-potential revenues at a standardized tax rate-of other communities using information on whether or not a community has any hotel-motel establishments and data on the total hotel-motel tax base in these non-local-option communities (the statewide tax base minus the tax base in all local-option communities). Not all local revenue capacity is available for general municipal purposes. Local governments face other demands, most notably for public schools, that draw on local revenue bases. Therefore, we subtract from local revenue capacity the capacity that is "used up" by non-municipal purposes, which we call "statutorily required reductions in capacity." These reductions are either required contributions or payments for services provided by other entities. For example, because of maintenance-of-effort provisions in the school aid formula, the Massachusetts Department of Education calculates a "required local contribution"-dollars to be raised through municipal property taxes-that each city or town must make to its local and/or regional public schools.
12 These required local contributions for schools comprise the largest reduction in capacity. Other reductions include county taxes, charges for regional transit, regional planning authorities, and state assessments for air pollution and mosquito control. These reductions do not refl ect local governments' choices or behavior, so we subtract the actual requirements and assessments from capacity. Although Massachusetts has no local governments other than cities and towns, and no entities other than state government and cities and towns with the power to levy taxes, these reductions in capacity are the equivalent of the revenues removed from a city's capacity by overlying governments, as analyzed by Ladd and Yinger (1989) in comparing the fiscal capacity of large cities nationwide.
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Finally, we calculate total non-school local revenue capacity as the sum of residential property tax capacity, CIP property tax capacity, and other local revenue capacity, minus statutorily required reductions in capacity. In 2000, per capita total non-school local revenue capacity for a city or town with average characteristics was $677. To show how different characteristics translate into estimated capacity variations, we construct several example cities and towns, which we call "prototype communities." The upper panel of Table 3 displays the values of capacity variables and estimated capacity for the average community and fi ve prototypes-large city, rural town, jobcenter suburb, higher-income residential suburb, and resort town-based on data for several actual cities and towns chosen to exemplify each descriptive label. Prototype Communities A (large city) and B (rural town) have very limited revenue capacity, with small per capita property tax bases, low incomes, and modest capacity from other revenue sources. Prototype Communities C (job-center suburb) and D (higher-income residential suburb) have greater local revenue-raising capacity, both from property taxes and from other local sources, while also having considerably greater revenue responsibility for schools, which uses up some 12 A community's required local contribution for schools is a function of the foundation spending level, year-toyear growth in local revenues, and state school aid, but does not refl ect actual local school spending decisions. 13 Downes and Pogue (2002) also point out that some local governments, often central cities, face "municipal overburden," as they must make extra spending to address issues such as poverty and deteriorating roads and bridges. They suggest that the amount of municipal overburden should be subtracted from local fi scal capacity just as we subtract statutorily required reductions in capacity; however, as explained below, we instead capture the overburden concept in our cost measure, with an equivalent effect on each community's cost-capacity gap.
Notes: Coeffi cient column reports statewide values applied to each community's characteristics. For residential capacity, residential values and income are raised to the coeffi cients' power, and a constant term (0.0175) is multiplicatively included; residential capacity is then added to CIP capacity, calculated as coeffi cient multiplied by value. For costs, coeffi cients are multipled by the value of cost factors; a constant ($403) is also included in each community's total cost (calculated so that the cost measure for the average community equals average adjusted non-school spending per capita). We multiply total jobs per resident in each community by the estimated coeffi cient on private jobs per resident.
Other local revenue capacity includes ability to raise revenue from motor vehicle excise, hotel-motel excise, urban redevelopment excise, local share of racing taxes, and state government payment in lieu of taxes for state-owned land. Statutorily required reductions in capacity include net minimum required local contribution for schools; county taxes; charges for MBTA, regional transit,Boston metro transit, and regional planning authorities; and state assessments for air pollution control and mosquito control. 15 These prototypes and the quintile cutoffs reported in Figure  3 show signifi cant variation across Massachusetts cities and towns in per capita non-school local revenue capacity in 2000.
NON-SCHOOL COST DIFFERENTIALS
Local jurisdictions differ in what it costs them, per capita, to provide the same quality and quantity of municipal services; some of these differences are attributable to the effi ciency of the production process they choose to adopt and some are attributable to factors in their environment that are outside their control. 16 One example of the latter, uncontrollable, environmental costs is that a community with more jobs per capita has to spend more on services for commuters and employers, such as traffi c lights, plowing, road maintenance, and police protection. Similarly, per capita fi refi ghting costs might differ across communities, depending on population density.
In the context of a median voter model, Bradbury et al. (1984) and Yinger (1986) show how environmental costs affect the production function and the expenditure function for local services. They derive an expenditure equation from a production function describing how local public services are produced, input prices, and demand functions indicating how local government service quality or quantity is determined. In the context of estimating education cost functions, such studies as Downes and Pogue (1994) and Duncombe and Yinger (2008) also introduce effi ciency as a determinant of expenditures. Specifi cally, local government expenditures in community i (S i ) are the product of quantity times price and, hence, are a function of local service levels Q i , efficiency of production f i , input costs p i , and environmental determinants of cost, E i :
Service levels in community i, Q i , refl ect two factors: the jurisdiction's service responsibilities and the choices made by residents and city or town offi cials about service quality. Service responsibilities do not vary appreciably across Massachusetts communities because cities and towns are responsible for fi nancing all local public services, as school districts are dependent on cities and towns for revenue, and county governments are now defunct (and never had much responsibility).
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Unlike test scores for educational services, direct measures of local service quality are lacking for general municipal services, so researchers model the quality level as resulting from local demand factors, D i , often assuming demand factors are expressed via a median voter model and, hence, include such factors as resource measures, local voter income, and other preference indicators such as residents' 14 The state provides less school aid and requires communities like these to make a greater local contribution to schools on account of their higher property values and income. 15 One outcome of using our measure of residential property tax capacity-which takes account of residents' incomes-is that communities like Prototype E have lower measured residential property tax capacity than they would using a simple RRS capacity measure that is proportional only to the size of their residential property tax base. 16 Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1969) developed the concept of environmental variables infl uencing the amount of public sector output available for a given expenditure on inputs. 17 One indication that responsibilities are the same for all cities and towns is the fact that no municipality reports zero spending on any of the four sub-categories reported in Tables 4 and 6 
Based on this expression, our reducedform estimating equation includes demand determinants, effi ciency-related variables, input price measures, and local attributes determining environmental costs. Like other researchers, we have no measures of outcomes or service levels that would allow us to estimate and then control directly for the effi ciency of production processes that local governments choose in supplying municipal services. Instead, to avoid or lessen omitted variable bias for the environmental-cost variables, we control for effi ciency indirectly. We include effi ciency-related variables proposed and tested by Duncombe and Yinger (2008) in the context of school district effi ciency. 18 These variables refl ect the ability and incentives that residents have to monitor their local government's effi ciency. For example, voters in communities with relatively plentiful resources (local capacity and state aid) or facing a lower tax price have less incentive to pressure their government offi cials to be effi cient. Similarly, voters' incentives and ability to monitor local government operations may vary with owner-occupied share of housing, residents' educational attainment and income, and the fraction of elderly residents.
Two other issues arise in obtaining unbiased estimates of environmental cost variations in this framework. First, because cities and towns (or the decisive voters in cities and towns) presumably respond to higher costs-just as they would to any higher price-by cutting back on consumption, high-cost communities will have slightly lower demand for public services than preference and resource factors alone would predict (Bradbury et al., 1984 , Downes and Pogue, 1994 , and Oakland, 1994 . That is, the cost coeffi cients we obtain are likely to be underestimates of the full effect of environmental factors on costs. 19 Second, as noted earlier with regard to capacity, the potential mobility of a community's residents among local jurisdictions in response to fi scal disparities could make local cost characteristics endogenous (Oakland, 1994) . A migration response to disparities in non-school costs or service levels is likely to be more attenuated than for schools, which account for over half of city and town spending and the location response to which has been well documented (for example, see Bradbury, Case, and Mayer, 1998) . 20 Furthermore, if it did occur, such a response could bias the coefficients on the cost factors either up or down depending on the relative mobility of jobs and residents, as well as of different types of residents (e.g., low-vs. high-income). Moreover, it is still the case that at any point in time, uncontrollable, environmental costs are predetermined in the medium term from the point of view of local offi cials.
In a departure from previous studies of either total spending or school spending, we limit the dependent variable to non-school spending in order to develop a measure of non-school costs for use in 18 On theoretical grounds, we do not adopt a multi-year panel approach to absorb ineffi ciency differences among communities as used in Downes and Pogue (1994) . Neither theory nor previous research suggests that effi ciency differences are any more or less time-invariant than the type of structural cost differences we are attempting to quantify. See, for example, the discussion (and rejection) of a fi xed-effects approach by Duncombe and Yinger (2008, p. 7) . 19 Inman (1979) estimates that these price elasticities are fairly low, however, around -0.3. 20 Also, we do a simple test for endogenous jobs, which fi nds no substantive difference between the base case and IV results. See Table 5 and discussion below.
a municipal (non-school) aid formula. The dependent variable is defined in per capita terms as all non-school city and town spending from the general fund, with three adjustments to make the series as consistent as possible across all communities. Appendix B describes the adjustments and their rationale. The resulting spending data exclude spending from enterprise funds, all public works spending on water, sewer, and solid waste disposal, and intergovernmental spending; they include all other general fund expenditure categories. The dependent variable is adjusted per capita non-school spending averaged over three fiscal years (FY2000-FY2002); the averaging is intended to smooth year-to-year fl uctuations in order to obtain coeffi cients that refl ect stable, long-term relationships. The earlier research of Bradbury et al. (1984) , Ladd and Yinger (1989) , and other studies summarized by Ladd (1994) suggest a variety of indicators of environmental, uncontrollable municipal costs for inclusion as elements of E i : population density, the fraction of the population with family income below the poverty line, 21 the unemployment rate, a measure of the number of private-sector employees per capita by place of work (measured where jobs are located, not where job-holders live), 22 population size and c hange, the prevalence of older housing units, the fraction of the population that is foreign-born, the number of miles of road per capita. In addition, input costs, p i , are proxied by an index refl ecting inter-municipal variations in private sector wages. The control variables represent local demand factors, D i (including resources and preferences) and effi ciency indicators, f i . As in Duncombe and Yinger (2008) , the effi ciency-related measures overlap with the resource and preference variables. Thus, we include a comprehensive measure of resources available for municipal purposes-net non-school local revenue capacity, as estimated in the previous section-tax price, the ratio of local aid to income, per capita income, educational attainment of adult residents, elder population percentage, and the owneroccupied fraction of the housing stock. In addition, we include control variables refl ecting the community's degree of local vs. regional public schools because some communities with a fully or partially local school district report their local-schoolrelated debt service and benefi ts costs (for example, teachers' health insurance) along with their municipal counterparts in the debt service, fi xed cost, and other spending category, and it is not possible to separate out this detailed sub-category. 23 21 The poverty rate is a proxy measure of an area's concentration of disadvantaged residents. Ladd (1994) notes that cities and towns with a higher poverty rate may have to spend more on social services than those with a lower poverty rate because disadvantaged residents tend to depend more on the public sector. For example, higher poverty rates could lead to higher public safety (fi re and police) costs because "the rents poor people can afford tend to be too low to support adequate housing maintenance" (Yinger, 1988b, p. 10-25) and "poor people are more likely than other people to be victims of crime and some people in impoverished circumstances resort to crime" (Ladd and Yinger, 1989, p. 85) . 22 Only private-sector employment is included so that potential ineffi ciency in the form of higher local government employment cannot bias upward the estimate of "uncontrollable" costs associated with commuters.
(The data do not allow us to separate city and town employees from other (federal and state) government employment located in the jurisdiction.) 23 The dummy variables indicate partially and fully regional schools, with fully local schools as the omitted category. We expect the signs on the two dummy variables to be negative, refl ecting the lower measured municipal spending on benefi ts and debt of towns with separate regional school districts. The choice of regional versus local school provision is correlated with population size and density for obvious reasons. This correlation implies that our estimated coeffi cients on these cost variables may be biased downward when we include the regional school dummies-that is, our cost estimates may be conservative; however, if we excluded them, the coeffi cients could be biased upward.
Summary statistics for variables used in the cost regressions are reported in Table  4 , and sources, in Appendix Table 1A .
Following Bradbury et al. (1984) , Yinger (1988a Yinger ( , 1988b , Ladd and Yinger (1989) , and Ladd, Reschovsky, Yinger (1991) , this paper uses a simple linear specifi cation to explain per capita non-school spending. In order to reduce noise and achieve a better fi t for the model, the equation is estimated on the 320 cities and towns in Massachusetts having a population greater than 1,000 in the year 2000, other than Provincetown. 24 Most explanatory variables are measured as of the year 2000.
Initial regression results for adjusted per capita non-school spending are shown in column 1 of Table 5 , including estimated coeffi cients and robust estimates of standard errors. 25 The estimated coeffi cients on a few cost factors are significantly different from zero, while the rest are not. Because we intend to use the cost-factor coeffi cients to compute a cost measure for the distribution of aid, we want to winnow down the list of cost variables to Observations are cities and towns in Massachusetts with population greater than 1,000 other than Provincetown. Asterisks indicate confi dence with which estimated coeffi cient is signifi cantly different from zero: *** 99% or greater; ** 95% to 99%; * 90% to 95%. In the multiplicative specifi cation, all variables are in natural logs except for the two school-system dummy variables. Instrumental variables specifi cation treats private employment and unemployment rate as endogenous variables, including their 1995 values as instruments.
those with signifi cant coeffi cients; 26 these are only density, poverty, commuters (employment), and the unemployment rate. The results of the regression from which other (non-signifi cant) cost and control variables are deleted are shown as the "basic version" in column 2 of Table  5 . 27 As in column 1, the estimated coeffi cients on these cost factors indicate that communities with greater density, more jobs per capita, and higher poverty and unemployment rates have to pay more per capita to provide a common bundle of municipal services, that is, these communities face a harsher environment for public production of non-school services.
The estimated coeffi cients on the control variables also have the expected signs and are statistically signifi cant. Non-school local revenue capacity is the most economically important. The tax price for the median resident (median house value divided by per-household property tax base) obtains its expected negative coefficient, indicating that costs borne by residents affect spending, presumably via both simple demand effects and monitoring incentives. Educational attainment of residents is positively associated with spending, suggesting that more educated residents demand higher-quality municipal services and perhaps also face a higher opportunity cost of monitoring effi ciency.
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The remaining columns in Table 5 report robustness checks. Column 3 reports a logarithmic specifi cation for the equation-an approach taken by other researchers-in which the signs and statistical signifi cance of key cost factors are similar to column 2. 29 In column 4, we report an instrumental variables version of the equation, intended to evaluate concerns with potential endogeneity of local jobs and unemployment rate. These two indicators are treated as endogenous variables and 1995 values are used as predetermined instruments. The estimated coeffi cients on the endogenous variables are somewhat larger, especially on unemployment, but the basic pattern of results is very similar to the non-IV version.
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Column 5 substitutes the standard property-value measure (market value of taxable property per capita) for net nonschool local revenue capacity. Although its inclusion enhances the explanatory power of the equation, the equalized value of property alone is conceptually a much less comprehensive measure of local revenue-raising ability-ignoring both other demands on the property tax base and other sources of local revenue. Table 6 reports "basic version" coeffi cient estimates for a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of subcategories of local non-school spending as dependent variables: public safety; adjusted public works; general government, health, welfare, culture, and recreation; and adjusted debt service, fi xed cost, and other. Because the sum of these spending subcategories equals total non-school spending and the 26 As Ladd (1994, p. 31) argues, "The criteria for a city characteristic to be included as a cost factor is that an intuitively plausible story can be told about how it would affect public spending and that it produce a statistically measurable effect in the regression equation." 27 The control variable indicating the prevalence of age 65 and older residents is also not signifi cant in column 1; in addition, the ratio of general local aid to income and the owner-occupied fraction of housing become insignifi cant when other non-signifi cant variables are deleted, and are also dropped from the regression. 28 An alternative interpretation is that educated residents monitor effi ciency more effectively than less educated residents (which would imply a negative sign), but the demand effect dominates. 29 Of course, a cost measure calculated using the coeffi cients from any of the "non-basic" estimating equations would differ somewhat from our basic version; specifi cally, a cost measure based on the logarithmic form would show less cost variation as a result of variations in individual variables but be more sensitive to positively correlated co-movements in the cost factors. 30 An alternative instrumental variables version (estimates not shown) used 1990 values of unemployment and jobs per capita as instruments and obtained very similar results.
equations are linear and include all the same variables, the coeffi cients on each variable sum across spending subcategories to equal the corresponding coeffi cient in column 1 (which repeats the total nonschool spending results from column 2 of Table 5 ). These disaggregated results indicate that commuters (or workplaces) and population density increase the per capita costs of providing all types of local government services except public works. Local per capita spending on public safety and on adjusted debt service-fi xed costother increases with the poverty rate. A higher unemployment rate raises the per capita costs of public safety and of general government services (including health, welfare, culture, and recreation). Among the control variables, educational attainment and revenue capacity have the most consistent positive effect across spending sub-categories. In addition, tax price is negatively related to public works and general government spending. 31 The effect of having (partially and fully) regional schools is concentrated in the adjusted debt service-fi xed costother category, as expected, refl ecting the lower measured municipal spending on benefi ts and debt of towns with separate regional school districts.
We calculate the cost measure, cost i , for each community i, as simulated per capita spending if all non-cost variables are set at their means and values of cost variables are the community's own:
where X ij is the value of cost factor j in community i, β j is the estimated coefficient on cost factor j from column 2 of Table 5 , and α is a constant that is numerically chosen so that the cost measure for a hypothetical "average community" with average values for the cost factors would be equal to average per capita non-school spending (see Table 3 ).
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Calculated in this way, the cost measure can be interpreted as an estimate of the per capita spending required for a community with i's characteristics to provide common local non-school services at average effi ciency.
In 2000, the cost measure ranges from $537 to $2,275, and averages $869. The lower panel of Table 3 displays the values of cost variables and estimated costs for the fi ve prototype communities to show how different characteristics translate into estimated cost variations. Prototype Communities A (large city), C (job-center suburb), and E (resort town) face higher costs of producing municipal services, with two to three cost factors above average. The large city has above-average density, poverty, and unemployment; the job-center suburb is also above-average in population density and extremely high (as its label implies) in jobs per capita; the resort town also faces above-average poverty rates and high levels of commuters. By contrast, costs are considerably lower in Prototype Communities B (rural town) and D (higher-income residential suburb), with lower density, less poverty, and fewer commuters. 
FISCAL GAP AND STATE AID
To calculate the per capita gap for each community, net per capita local revenue capacity is subtracted from estimated per 31 The overall explanatory power of the public works equation is very low. 32 We make one adjustment to this procedure. We multiply total employment per capita in town i by the estimated coeffi cient on private employment per capita. This adjustment is made under the assumption that the marginal effect of public employment on uncontrollable spending is the same as that of private employment. It is politically untenable for the costs associated with federal and state government employee commuters not to be refl ected in the aid formula, exactly as private commuters are, yet the data do not allow us to separate local from state and federal government employment. However, this adjustment introduces a very slight incentive for communities to increase their city or town government employment, at the margin, to obtain additional aid if aid is distributed toward high-cost communities. That is, the cost of an additional local government employee is slightly reduced by the inclusion of public employment in calculating costs for incorporation in an aid formula. We believe the incentive effect is miniscule, however, because local government employment is only eight percent of total employment in Massachusetts. Thus, if a community added to its public sector head count, the action would alter total employment a very small amount, and the cost measure even less. 33 Above-average unemployment rates raise costs in the rural town, but below-average values for the other cost factors are more than offsetting. capita costs. The relative size of the gap represents the degree of mismatch for cities and towns between their costs of a common bundle of municipal services and their ability to raise revenue from local sources for municipal purposes. As the bottom row of Table 3 shows, the per capita non-school cost-capacity gap for a city or town with average characteristics in Massachusetts was $192 in 2000. The distribution ranges from large negative gaps-for example, as shown for the resort town prototype (Community E), which has a very large property tax baseto substantial positive gaps, as shown for the large city prototype (Community A), with high costs and low capacity.
Legend

34
In between, Prototype Community D (higher-income residential suburb) has moderate costs and relatively high capacity, yielding a smaller negative gap, while Prototype Communities B and C have gaps larger than that of the average community, but for different reasons-Community B (rural town) has moderate costs and very low capacity while Community C (job-center suburb) has high costs and slightly below-average capacity. Overall, we estimate substantial inter-local disparities across Massachusetts cities and towns in their per capita non-school gaps ( Figure 5 ). It is important to update the measures of costs, capacity, and gap periodically so that the aid calculation in each year is based on accurate, current information. Because of the way we calculate these measures, there are two update-related issues. First, the values of the cost and capacity factors that enter into the gap calculations for each of the 351 cities and towns should be updated annually, because they may change from year to year and the data for most factors except those from the decennial census are available on an annual basis (see Appendix  Table 1A ). The statewide constants in the cost and capacity calculations (that is, α, τ 1 , and τ 2 ) should also be updated to retain the equality between average spending or tax levy in that year and the calculated costs or capacity for the community with average characteristics. 35 Second, by contrast, the estimated coeffi cients in the cost and capacity regressions do not need to be updated often, because the underlying relationships are not likely to change rapidly over time. A practical approach would be to re-estimate them every ten years when decennial census data become available.
Existing general-purpose aid programs in Massachusetts (lottery aid and additional assistance) do not well address inter-local fiscal disparities. Figure 6 compares per capita existing aid with non-school cost-capacity gaps in 2000. Although larger-gap municipalities generally receive more aid than smaller-gap municipalities, these existing aid distributions are rather loosely associated with fi scal gaps across communities. The correlation between lottery aid and gap is 0.441, while the correlation between additional assistance and gap is only 0.091. Compared to existing formulas, a new aid formula based on this gap measure would be better able to target needier communities and in general channel more aid to communities with higher 34 One might ask why people stay in high-cost, low-capacity cities and towns. Yinger (1986) shows that it is more likely for the poor to live in high-cost, low-capacity areas because they are outbid by the wealthy for housing in low-cost, high-capacity municipalities. He also points out that racial and ethnic discrimination and restrictive zoning may play a role in constraining the mobility of poor households. 35 When one community changes its spending or tax collection from year to year, it would not affect the coeffi cients, but only the statewide constants (α, τ 1 , and τ 2 ), which are applied to all communities. Therefore, this method of calculating the gap measure does not reward communities for increasing spending or failing to pass overrides and does not punish communities for reducing spending or passing overrides either. Aid per capita uncontrollable costs and lower revenue capacity.
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CONCLUSION
This paper develops new measures of local revenue capacity and uncontrollable costs for potential use in a new, generalpurpose aid formula for Massachusetts cities and towns. On the revenue-capacity side, we focus on accounting for the constraints of a tax limitation. We utilize data on recent taxing patterns to develop a measure of the effective constraints of Proposition 2½ that is exogenous from the perspective of local offi cials and use that measure to adjust the size of the local property tax base in measuring revenue capacity. Modeling the constraints as a function of residents' incomes, we fi nd that local governments in higher-income communities have greater ability to tap into their residential property tax base and, thus, are less constrained by the local property tax limitation. Our capacity measure also takes account of each community's ability to raise revenue from nonresidential property taxes and other (non-property-tax) local sources, and subtracts the local revenue capacity not available for general municipal (nonschool) purposes.
On the cost side, we focus on quantifying the effects of environmental-costrelated characteristics on local non-school spending. We fi nd that communities with greater population density, number of commuters, unemployment, and poverty have higher costs, while controlling for the impacts of total net non-school local revenue capacity, preferences, effi ciency, and institutional factors.
We measure the fi scal "gap" for each community as the difference between its locally uncontrollable costs and its local revenue capacity. Such measurements indicate that Massachusetts cities and towns vary widely in the degree of mismatch between their costs and capacity. A new municipal aid formula that distributes per capita aid as a function of measured per capita gaps across communities would help to alleviate these substantial inter-local fi scal disparities. Such a gap-based approach would provide more aid to cities and towns with higher uncontrollable costs and lower ability to raise revenue locally , other things being equal.
Our measurement approach is designed for Massachusetts but potentially applicable to other states facing similar challenges. Like Massachusetts, many other states have been "reforming" their approach to education fi nance, resulting in signifi cant increases in school aid; the "No Child Left Behind Act" and court mandates have increased the incentive for states to concentrate aid on schools (Baicker and Gordon, 2006) . School aid, however, often crowds out general-purpose municipal (non-school) aid in state budgets. Moreover, in the wake of the 2001 recession, some states, such as Michigan and Minnesota-and Massachusettsfroze or cut general-purpose local aid. Thus, policymakers in other states may see general-purpose aid as an important issue, and our approach could be useful to them. If one were cognizant of institutional idiosyncrasies, it would be fairly easy to replicate our method using other states' data. On the local revenue capacity side, 42 other states have local tax limitations (Mullins and Wallin, 2004) and none has incorporated the constraints of tax limitations in its aid formula. On the cost side, only Minnesota (to our knowledge) currently incorporates a measure of exogenous cost differences into its non-school aid formula. 37 Adapting our approach to measuring both revenue capacity and uncontrollable costs could help these states to develop fairer aid distributions. 
